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MISMANAGING THE MARKETPLACE: THE ECONOMY OF THE
ONLINE PUBLIC FORUM AND SECTION 230 LIABILITY
Zachary Osborne*
Justice Holmes considered the free exchange of ideas to
be a sufficient tool for balancing speech interests, stating, “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which [the citizenry’s] wishes safely can be carried
out.”1 On its most basic level of operation, the marketplace of
ideas (hereinafter “Marketplace”) is expected to be a model of
free exchange where denizens contribute, and judges perfect the
balance of competition by striking down threatening
regulations.2 Under the Marketplace construction, positing an
idea will subject it to market forces engaging in an adversarial
process.3 When the majority takes part in this exchange, the
result expects to inform and improve the political speech of those
involved. This interplay between interests is similar to the
invisible hand theory of marketplace competition where
individual self-interest will lead to an accurate reflection of
societal valuation.4
Appropriately, there is an ever-present concern that the
regulation of the market “raises the specter that the Government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.”5 The marketplace has been an omnipresent
institution in American political discourse since our country’s
inception and holds steadfast against efforts by government to
chill dissenters and minority voices.6 Perhaps then, there needs
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022, University of North Carolina School of Law.
Special thanks to Andrew Coyle, Lieth Khatib, and Jarrod Nelson for many helpful
comments and suggestions, to Morgan Higgins for unwavering emotional support, to
the editors of the First Amendment Law Review, and to my father, David Osborne,
whose spirited conversation inspired this topic.
1
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 592
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (considering the actual distinctions between the
Marketplace and a marketplace for goods).
3
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
4
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., U. Chi. Press 1976).
5
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
6
For examples of government attempts to chill and suppress dissenting voices, see,
e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919) (upholding conviction of
mailing a “treasonable” book); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(upholding conviction of a socialist for violating the Espionage Act of 1917).
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to be a healthy balance of regulation by the government within
the Marketplace. But, as technology introduces new forms of
communication, contribution to the Marketplace begins to
evolve beyond the model envisioned by Holmes. Specifically, the
introduction of social media as a forum for exchange has
presented unforeseen obstacles to the Marketplace’s continued
function and received none of the restrictions placed on other
forms of media, despite being a considerable force in the trade of
ideas. Social media has been elevated into this position, in large
part, due to its uninhibited growth and protection under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.7
Part I of this Note will discuss Section 230, its
interpretation in the courts, and the perspective of one of the
bill’s co-sponsors, Christopher Cox, as to the role he sees Section
230 playing in 2020 and beyond. It is within the context of his
observations that this Note will assert that Section 230, in
protecting Internet platforms from liability for information
hosted on their platforms, too greatly contributes to the
degradation of the Marketplace. When the Marketplace is placed
under a strain of modern-day information-sharing in crisis, the
social media apparatus exacerbates already-present issues
beyond the Marketplace’s control.
Part II will address where the cracks in the doctrine have
emerged. The confluence of several abstract issues with Internet
platforms (hereinafter “platforms”) constitutes sufficient grounds
to begin an expansion of the Section 230 liability doctrine,
particularly as COVID-19 has now assigned substantial gravity
to their ill-effects on the Marketplace.8 Until this point, we have
been content to allow the Marketplace’s machinery to work
overtime, but this particular load has been the result of a unique
maelstrom of concerns, each of which has been apparent, but
underrealized as to how much legislative or judicial action is
needed to address its unwanted effects. In light of the COVID-19
pandemic’s catalyzing of already-established issues within
Section 230 doctrine, the potential for misuse of platforms has
risen to a level that surely concludes its current existence within
a permitted liability framework reflects too great a harm to the
Marketplace, overshadowing most of the benefits it provides and
7

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
The term “platforms” should be understood as any interactive technology which
facilitates the creation or exchange of any information, ideas, interests, or other
expressive form through the construction of connected virtual networks.
8
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requiring change of its statutory protections for platform
operation.
Part III considers changing the doctrine and whether
alteration or outright abandonment of the Section 230 regime is
the wisest course of action. As with any regulation of speech,
there is always a chance that its enactment will chill the speech
of good faith contributors and represent a slippery slope of First
Amendment decay. Social media has undoubtedly invigorated
the Marketplace with its presence. Given how the Marketplace
has functioned in its absence, there may be a need to simply meet
this unsavory speech with a concerted stream of counterspeech
where the effects of that exchange reinvigorate the idea trade.
Outright revocation of Section 230 would represent a stark
change to nearly thirty years of jurisprudence and present new
and daunting legal threats to platforms defending themselves
from claims, likely prompting a tsunami of new litigation that
would threaten platform operation. Part III will also examine
some of the proposed solutions to the current doctrinal climate,
combating misinformation, and how those solutions would take
effect. While both the judiciary and legislature are equipped to
influence Section 230, the choice of which actor is best suited for
the job turns on several pivotal questions. Legal classifications
for entities might prove to be as effective as a legislative
amendment in some cases, while others might have an issue with
standing and require special provisions for these types of claims.
Part IV will examine the potential policy issues with
shrinking Section 230’s protections for platforms as well as the
legal obstacles in the path of relaxing its liability protections. At
the forefront of the Section 230 problem lies the distinction
between a public and private entity and the government’s
inability to affect the actions of privately-run entity. Of the
solutions presented, a number stand out as potential antidotes,
such as expanding the definition of what constitutes an
information content provider. As of the writing of this Note,
there appears to be no clear answer to the liability problem, but
the solutions presented are certainly good first steps.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT OF 1996
The relevant part of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (hereinafter “CDA”) prevents holding providers and users
of an “interactive computer service” liable due to “any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.”9 In effect, Section 230 operates in a
way where platforms are generally not held liable for the content
of third parties unless they are somehow taking part in
developing the illegal content, which would render them
culpable under criminal law.10 The emergent issue of platform
responsibility saw its first significant judicial development in
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.11 In Stratton, an
allegation made on a Prodigy message board about Stratton
Oakmont and its president engaging in criminal acts and fraud
led to the firm responding with a lawsuit against Prodigy and the
unnamed user for defamation.12 While Stratton was a defamation
case, Congress took concern with the holding that placed
responsibility on platforms to control inappropriate material and
its availability to minors.13 Absent Section 230 protections, an
entity who hosted particular speech over the Internet, even on
their own platform, could be held liable for defamation even if
they were not the author of the text or even aware of the
statement.14
A co-sponsor of the CDA, Christopher Cox, considers the
application of Section 230 to be a balancing act where content
creators are liable for illegal activity while appropriately
insulating content-hosting platforms from a deluge of claims.15
9

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 230(e)(1).
11
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau Cty. May 24, 1995).
12
Id.
13
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104–
230, at 194 (1996)) (“One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to
overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions . . . .”); H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996).
14
See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc., at *5; see also Zehran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 333–34 (4th Cir. 1997).
15
Christopher Cox, The Origins and Original Intent of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, RICH. J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2020),
10
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Despite never reaching the Supreme Court for review, courts
have taken myriad approaches to the application and
interpretation of the CDA. In Zeran v. America Online,16 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that,
“§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.”17 Specifically, “§
230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher's role.”18 The Fourth
Circuit considered the statutory purpose of Section 230 again on
the basis of the plain language, where Congress had recognized
the threat lawsuits posed to a burgeoning Internet medium.19
This consideration for the preservation of the Internet as a
marketplace has not diminished in most courts since 1997,
though there have been some situations where immunity might
be withdrawn.20
In the past, the First Circuit has stood as the
jurisprudential outlier in its analysis of Section 230, though its
position has since come in line with the rest of the circuits.21 In
Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,22 it held that “claims that a website
facilitates illegal conduct through its posting rules necessarily treat
the website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by third
parties and, thus, are precluded by Section 230(c)(1).”23 The First
Circuit, citing Zeran, concluded the designation of “publisher” in
Section 230(c)(1) extends to website policies that prescribe how
to treat postings where features reflect choices about what
content can appear on the website, and in what form.24 However,
https://jolt.richmond.edu/2020/08/27/the-origins-and-original-intent-of-section230-of-the-communications-decency-act.
16
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
17
Id. at 330.
18
Id.
19
Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(3).
20
See generally Zehran, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
21
See, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2021); Obado v. Magedson,
612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015); Erie Ins., Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135
(4th Cir. 2019); Diez v. Google, Inc., 831 F. App’x 723 (5th Cir. 2020); Almeida v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882
F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
22
817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
23
Id. at 22.
24
Id. at 20–21 (citing Zeran’s description of decisions whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone, or alter content as “traditional editorial functions” and noting that a
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in a re-pleading by three new plaintiffs, the First Circuit
reconsidered that, where Backpage revised an advertisement by
altering a word, it effectively made Backpage a content provider
and therefore not protected under Section 230.25 According to
Mr. Cox, this reconsideration places the First Circuit back within
the majority interpretation of Section 230 protections where the
distinction between publisher and platform determines
immunity from liability.26
Considered by Mr. Cox to be the landmark decision for
the CDA, the Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com27 rejected blanket immunity
under Section 230 when platforms participate in the content
creation process or develop content created by others.28 The
court held that, when materially contributing to content’s alleged
unlawfulness, a website helping in the development of unlawful
content falls within the exception of Section 230 and can
therefore be held liable.29 In doing so, the court considered their
decision to be consistent with Congressional intent that the CDA
serves to “preserve the free-flowing nature of Internet speech and
commerce without unduly prejudicing the enforcement of other
important state and federal laws.”30
Since 1996, Mr. Cox still contends that one of the most
convincing critiques about Section 230, namely that it was
necessary to protect an industry in its infancy, is patently false.31
Mr. Cox contends that, more than ever, Section 230 protections
are necessary because the overwhelming amount of content that
would need to be policed has made the potential consequences
of publisher liability even more demanding for protections.32 He
argues that, when considering a new wave of speech regulation,
“[r]ecalling its deep flaws, myriad unintended consequences, and
dangerous threats to both free speech and the functioning of the

website is classified as a publisher where they are the “speaker of material” posted by
users on the site).
25
Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1542056 at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 29,
2018).
26
Cox, supra note 15, at 57.
27
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
Id. at 1163–64.
29
Id. at 1168.
30
Id. at 1175.
31
Cox, supra note 15, at 61.
32
Id.
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[I]nternet is a worthwhile reality check.”33 Surely then, Section
230 stands as the sole bulwark against a tyrannical regulatory
state where, in its absence, the online services on which we rely
would languish and reemerge as tools of authoritarianism or
result in the collapse of Internet services altogether.
There are compelling arguments for Mr. Cox’s position.
The advent of social media certainly has heralded a golden
opportunity for the Marketplace to grow.34 Facebook, Twitter,
Google, and others give each individual user the power to reach
out to persons beyond their geographic location or
socioeconomic class to discuss new ideas and subject old ones to
an even greater bank of market forces.35 In addition to exposure
and discussion between Americans, platforms introduce ideas
and persons from beyond the regulatory reach of the First
Amendment to contribute to the Marketplace. This type of
connection is unprecedented in human history. It is the
preservation of this exchange that the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 sought to ensure in governing the allocation of
liability for platforms due to third-party content.36
II. FAILURE TO AGE GRACEFULLY
There are three issue areas worth considering in the
examination of Section 230’s antiquated presence when facing
national security interests, placed in the context of the COVID19 crisis. COVID-19 has presented a unique vacuum for study of
the Marketplace’s machinations, where the accuracy of
information, access to forum, and infliction of market forces
becomes ever more heightened as a necessity for preserving
national security, public health, and constitutional constructions
amidst tumultuous circumstances. While presented distinctly,
each issue bleeds over into the others by virtue of the sections
33

Id. at 67.
Dawn C. Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public Forum Doctrine
Goes Digital 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2–3 (2019); see also Jacob R. Straus &
Matthew E. Glassman, Social Media in Congress: The Impact of Electronic Media on
Member Communications, 8–9 (2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44509.pdf .
35
Nunziato, supra note 34, at 3.
36
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458 at 86–88 (1996) (discussing Congressional
findings to support the protection for private block and screening of offensive
material and noting that the Internet “offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse . . .” and “. . . [benefits from] a minimum of government regulation”).
34
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enabling one another, often ensuring that a single solution will
not suffice to meet the overall issue.
First is a question of whether the machinery of the
Marketplace can even keep up with the high-speed inputs of
millions of users, American or otherwise, contributing to the
stream with dubious expectations for truth. In a crisis, the
Marketplace still expects that actors have the time to rationally
scrutinize the trustworthiness of sources, but COVID-19 has
made a strong and deadly case that self-regulation of platforms
is not enough to negate concerns about the presentation of
information. This analysis considers what is at stake in the
conversation about Section 230 protections for platforms and
how the Marketplace’s structure is beginning to wane as it fails
to self-correct without some sort of negative cost. When
consuming information on the Internet, how many Americans
are consciously considering whether a source can serve as a
trustworthy, actionable substratum with which to inform
themselves?
Second is an investigation into whether the role platforms
play in the Marketplace has far-exceeded the “economy”
approach to illuminating truth in public discourse. When
discussing the Marketplace, it is important to consider where the
conversations are held, and which information is seen by
participants. Functioning as informational monopolies,
platforms have outgrown merely being hosts of user information
as they actively contribute to miring of information while
simultaneously settling in as a quasi-necessity in American life.
The function of platforms gives the impression of freedom of
speech as it should exist in the Marketplace but functions much
differently in practice. This disconnect from the Marketplace’s
original role is exacerbated when elements of the public forum
are injected into the discussion, leaving platforms just beyond the
reach of the First Amendment’s restrictions, but granting them
ample protections from assuming responsibility for their everexpanding roles in discourse. This displacement of cost has been
key in enabling bad-faith actors to become ever-boldened in
polluting discourse with outright disinformation, particularly in
light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Finally, there is a very real possibility that not all
platforms will be subject to First Amendment protections or
regulation, given their ownership by foreign actors, creating
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potential for harms to users beyond the protections or remedies
afforded to them by American courts and potentially invoking
concerns of national security. There is a real cost to allowing
harmful or untruthful speech to run unregulated across the
Internet, especially when it is often beyond the reach of the
consequences the Marketplace normally imposes for such
behavior and the counter-speech of other voices. In allowing
users easy access to an audience of their choice, platforms
actively connect users to groups sharing ideas that are never
subject to sufficient market forces to test their truthfulness,
depriving the Marketplace of its infliction of cost on the speaker.
This has allowed for groups with ideas already maligned or
discouraged by society at large to espouse their promulgations at
a volume unprecedented in modern conversation. Given both
the inability of its userbase to discern the value of information
and the dependence on a particular vacuum environment, social
media does not operate in the same context as social discourse,
where it is much harder to tailor one’s audience and inputs.
Contrary to Mr. Cox’s trivialization of the issue, Section
230 has enabled an unprecedented level of growth in an industry
whose business model wholly revolves around the construction,
maintenance, and exploitation of the Marketplace. These same
platforms host information with uniform presentation, regardless
of the legitimacy of the source material. Both formally and
informally, individuals, groups, organizations, news sources,
and a growing number of political figures utilize social media as
a means of educating and communicating with Internet denizens
across a wide array of topics.37 To his credit, Mr. Cox could not
have anticipated the level to which social media would play a
role in the life of the everyday American in 1996; even more
reason why Section 230’s presence requires reconsideration.
A. What Information is Worth Consuming?
In his work, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Frederick
Schauer posits two assumptions about the Marketplace Theory
and its reliance on the adversarial nature of free exchange of
ideas as an exercise in divining truth.38 First, the Marketplace
37
38

See Christine A. Lukes, Social Media, 58 AAOHN J. 415, 415–16 (2010).
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 16 (1982).
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Theory assumes that the American public possesses the ability
and resources to discern truthfulness.39 When the public is using
reason to make contributions and conclusions in the exchange,
the Marketplace functions smoothly. However, there is an
additional assumption at play here as to whether the public
wants to conduct this analysis or even knows when to employ it.
This is due to a blending of official and unofficial sources hosted
in the same manner. When viewing a blend of news and
entertainment on social media, users pay less attention to the
sources of that information.40 The jumbling of content together
greatly diminishes the ability of the average person to distinguish
what is to be taken seriously.41 It does not help that the platforms
themselves do not distinguish specific sources of information. On
Facebook, for example, the color, font, size, and tags on a post
from the New York Times reads the same as an ad for Hulu.42
When the presentation of information to a user is already
confusing, how is one supposed to even begin to address its
validity? At the outset, there is already translation required to
determine, from user-interface to actual, substantive
information, exactly who is behind the information being
presented to the user.
Providing further difficulty is the presence of “official”
and “unofficial” sources being shared in the online marketplace.
Official news sources, historically considered more meritorious,
are comprised of traditional newsgathering entities, journalists,
scientific studies, and the like. These are usually institutional, but
certainly can present as much bias as any other source of speech.
A hallmark of an official source is the inclusion of some expert
in their respective industry with the ability to verify authorship
on the information contained within. A story on disease
symptoms and treatment, for example, should understandably
have contributions from an immunologist or epidemiologist,
given their expertise in the subject matter. Unofficial sources of
news traditionally originate from users or unknown entities
hosting content that may be unoriginal––such as memes,
39

See id. at 26.
George Pearson, Sources on Social Media: Information context collapse and volume of
content as predictors of source blindness, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 3580, 3582–83
(2020).
41
Id.; Hunt Allcott, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 211, 214–26 (2017).
42
See Lara O’Reilly, Facebook wants to turn its mobile ad network into an even bigger
business by running 'native' ads on other apps, BUSINESS INSIDER, (May 6, 2015, 5:00pm)
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-audience-network-ads-native-ad-tools2015-5.
40
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comments, and product promotions––all lack the authoritative
presence found in official sources.
Regardless of classification, both official and unofficial
sources have the capacity to be proved or disproved by objective
evidence. A conscientious reader can take it upon themselves to
verify the truthfulness of a study and peer through data bias.
However, this type of gatekeeping analysis requires the user to
continually monitor content quality, where credibility is a
perception that can be manipulated, or even faked, when the
proper characteristics are applied. However, one must ask
whether this conscientious reader even exists and, if they do,
whether they are able to conduct such an analysis while
belabored by a deluge of information.
The second assumption requires the steady injection of
ideas into the Marketplace, whether true or false. The
Marketplace assumes idea erosion will shape and sift until
society arrives at the best possible idea.43 However, Schauer
contends that a proper open debate resulting in a benefit is not
always a guarantee.44 Rather, “additional propositions can retard
knowledge as well as advance it.”45 He acknowledges there is
inherent risk in the suppressing of certain speech but asserts the
contrary is also true where failure to suppress a statement that
requires action might result in harm.46 In these situations, one
must consider the benefit of the speech running free against the
potential risk supposed by its suppression.47
Consider the historical context in which Justice Holmes
wrote his dissent in Abrams, notwithstanding the influence of
Milton or Mill on the raw concept itself.48 In 1919, radio was the
closest analogy to what social media has become, and its power
pales in comparison to the reach of the Internet. Transmission by
radio in 1919 required specific operational knowledge, complex
43

See Schauer, supra note 38, at 27.
Id. at 33.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 29.
47
Id.
48
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (John W. Hales ed., Oxford University Press 1961);
John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 13–48 (R. McCallum ed., 1946).
44
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equipment, and the final product still only reached those who
had some sort of access to the radio at the time of broadcasting.49
In 2021, where around sixty-nine percent of American adults
have Facebook, the number of daily posts accessible to a vast
number of users is astronomical in comparison, and yet the
Marketplace would have these users conduct the same analysis
expected in 1919.50 Simply put, the time necessary to consider
and substantiate or refute an idea is not built into Holmes’
original construction. If a single idea needs to be addressed by
reason and valued accordingly in order to sustain the healthy
trade of ideas, what hope does a single person have when
confronted with hundreds of thousands of these calculations per
day? Diversity of opinion begins to lose some of its value when
there is immense difficulty in the selection process.
Unfortunately, the requisite media literacy required to
navigate the Marketplace in 1919 is not the same in 2021 thanks
to the presence of platforms. There are simply too many inputs
to consider, far more than any reasonable user could identify and
process in a day. To conceptualize the infeasibility of the task, it
is appropriate to consider a more technical manner of valuing the
utility of information. On average Americans have been found
to consume around thirty-four gigabytes of data and information
daily, a figure that has increased about 350 percent since 1980.51
But what does this mean in practice for the Marketplace?
Obviously, that’s quite a bit more to consider than in 1919, but
surely the wealth of information accessible to the average
American is a boon to the Marketplace’s function. Or rather that
would be the case but for the nature of information consumption.
Information is not plainly useful based on the amount of
information and its accessibility. It also depends on whether that
information can be internalized in such a significant quantity.
To provide a more usable measurement for this
discussion, data analysists employ the use of a discipline called
psychometrics, which concern the “quantification and
measurement of mental attributes, behavior, performance, and
49

See Thomas H. White, Broadcasting After World War One (1918-1921), U.S. EARLY
RADIO HISTORY, http://earlyradiohistory.us/sec016.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
50
John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR., (May 16,
2019) https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americansand-facebook/.
51
Nick Bilton, Part of the Daily American Diet, 34 Gigabytes of Data, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2009) https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/technology/10data.html.
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the like.”52 Employing psychometrics, a venture capital firm
called Loup Ventures developed a formula for better
understanding
the
“meaningfulness”
of
information
communicated to the average person.53 The base formula is
rather simple and finds its roots in the seminal piece by C.E.
Shannon, which details the communication of meaning on a
mathematical level.54 The exchange has two parts: (1) that a
message is intentionally conveyed from speaker to consumer
with an intended “meaning” and (2) the message must be
interpreted by the consumer to discover the underlying
meaning.55 Here lies the difficulty with the number of inputs: to
appreciate conveyed meaning, consumer interpretation must
take place in some form to appreciate a type of marginal utility.56
Without proper consumption, the meaning of the information is
lost, and the consumer will not be as likely to utilize that source
again. Loup Ventures notates their measure of information as the
utility of information as equal to the value of the meaning
interpreted by the consumer, opposite the time it takes to
consume that information.57 This metric’s relevance to the
discussion of discourse in the online forum is merely its ability to
illustrate the gravity of the issue with consumers’ ability to
contribute to the Marketplace meaningfully in the Information
Era. As its base conclusion, it represents the futility of any
ordinary person attempting to properly engage with all the
information available to them, a realization that directly
implicates the efficacy of the Marketplace of Ideas. Where there
is an overwhelming surplus of information, consumers tend to
narrow the scope of their inputs or simply ignore new data
altogether, ultimately leaving certain components necessary to

52

Psychometrics, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N DICTIONARY OF PSYCH.,
https://dictionary.apa.org/psychometrics (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
53
See Doug Clinton, Defining the Future of Human Information Consumption, LOUP
VENTURES (Jun. 12, 2018) https://loupventures.com/defining-the-future-of-humaninformation-consumption/.
54
See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM TECH.
J. 379, 379–86 (1948).
55
Id. at 379–81.
56
See Andrew Bloomenthal, Marginal Utility, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marginalutility.asp (noting that marginal
utility is a term from economics related to the satisfaction a consumer derives from
consuming a particular product that will ultimately determine its utility and rate of
future consumption).
57
See Clinton, supra note 53.
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the Marketplace’s operation lacking.58 This realization
unfortunately makes very little difference to the platforms
themselves.
Platforms profit on the confusing delivery and
presentation of information on their sites via the way they impact
human behavior. This is largely by design, as they are tailored to
fulfill a performative desire, not the facilitation of a public
forum.59 Taking the time to fact-check an article, a meme, or
even the assertion of friend or follower is a far less compelling
use of one’s time than simply disseminating the information to a
personal “audience” accompanied with color commentary.60
This “identity performance,” in turn, encourages others to
perform the same process according to their ideological
identification.61 Simply, users on social media want to be viewed
positively by their peers and will act in furtherance of this goal,
rather than take steps to ensure what they are posting is correct.62
This cycle is antithetical to the idea of the Marketplace and
requires neither the presence of a discerning informational
consumer, nor a desire to unearth the truth. In certain cases, this
clouding of information can pose a danger well beyond being
misinformed.63 In a speech to the World Health Organization in
February 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus recognized the threat of misinformation
in the Internet sphere, emphasizing that “we’re not just fighting
58

See Fred Douglis, Information Overload, 140 Characters at a Time, 13 INST. OF
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INTERNET COMPUTING 4, 4–5 (2009);
Avery E. Holton, News and the Overloaded Consumer: Factors Influence Information
Overload Among New Consumers, 15 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL
NETWORKING, 619, 621–22 (2012).
59
See Twitter, Inc. Form S-3 Registration Statement, SEC (June 5, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000156459015004890/twtr-s3_20150605.htm (noting that Twitter asserts their success based on user and ad
engagement, supported by content contribution by users to expose them to ads).
60
Casey Bond, Posting on Social Media is not Activism (Sorry, Fellow White People),
HUFFPOST (June 11, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/social-media-notactivism_l_5ee151a7c5b6dd4f3be385c5 (explaining the concept of performative
allyship).
61
Robert Elliott Smith, My social media deeds look different from yours and it’s driving
political polarization, USA TODAY (Sept. 2, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/09/02/social-mediaelection-bias-algorithms-diversity-column/2121233001/.
62
Id.
63
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html (last
accessed Jan. 18, 2021) (stating that as of Jan. 15, 202, there have been 397,612
American deaths due to COVID-19).
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an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic.”64 Americans have
long recognized the issues with misinformation on social media,
as some sixty-four percent of U.S. adults state fabricated news
stories cause a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of
issues and events.65 COVID-19 has given the presence of
misinformation on platforms serious weight, even more apparent
as a threat to the Marketplace exchange, specifically with respect
to the sharing of official information across platforms66 and the
distortion of that information therein.67 In these conditions, the
Marketplace cannot fulfill its proper functions, causing harm to
the informational ecosystem.68 Despite the grave cost of rampant
misinformation, platforms recognize the benefits of exploiting
the Marketplace even during a crisis and have done little in the
way of stemming the flow of misinformation.69
Ultimately, conflicting information and the failure of the
Marketplace to produce swift truth has unequivocally resulted in
death due to the lack of vetting information across normal

64

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Munich Security Conference, WHO (Feb. 15, 2020)
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/munich-security-conference.
65
Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake
News is Showing Confusion, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-issowing-confusion/ (“These results come from a survey of 1,002 U.S. adults
conducted from Dec. 1 to 4, 2016.”).
66
Id. (showing that forty-two percent of respondents said that social media and
search engines should bear responsibility for the spread of fake news).
67
Matthew A. Braum et al., The State of the Nation: A 50-State COVID-19 Survey Report
#14: Misinformation and Vaccine Acceptance, THE COVID STATES PROJECT (Sept. 23,
2020),
http://www.kateto.net/covid19/COVID19%20CONSORTIUM%20REPORT%201
4%20MISINFO%20SEP%202020.pdf (finding that of 21,000 individuals surveyed,
around twenty-four to twenty-five percent believed inaccurate claims about COVID19).
68
See generally Dawn Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem: Social Media Platforms’ Efforts
to Combat Medical and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 33 (2019).
69
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Posts Revenue Growth Despite Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (updated
July 30, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-fb-2q-earnings-report-202011596138406 (noting, as of July 2020, Facebook had generated $5.18 billion in the
quarter); Queenie Wong & Jon Skillings, Twitter’s user growth soars amid coronavirus,
but uncertainty remains, CNET (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.cnet.com/news/twitters-user-growth-soars-amid-coronavirus-butuncertainty-remains/ (noting that, in April, Twitter was up three percent on the year
with accompanying a twenty-four percent increase of daily active users compared to
the same time last year).
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channels.70 The presentation of information on platforms is
stress-testing the Marketplace beyond its limits, threatening the
jurisprudential doctrine it supports. This issue is amplified when
the marketplace afforded by platforms begins to eclipse the other
mediums of communication, creating a sort of informational
monopoly directed by a few untouchable actors who control an
ever-growing aspect of the public forum.
B. A Grossly Imperfect Economy
In 2018, Pew Research recorded that social media sites
were emerging as a prevalent resource for Americans seeking
news, surpassing print newspapers.71 Thirty-four percent of U.S.
adults said they preferred to get news online, despite a majority
of respondents (fifty-seven percent) who consume news on social
media stating they expect the news they see on platforms to be
largely inaccurate.72 However, respondents in both the 18-29 and
30-49 age ranges receive a significant amount of their news on
social media, with those in the 18-29 range being four times as
likely than those 65+ to often get their news from social media.73
This problematic trend of apathetically relying on an imperfect
delivery of information elicits troubling conclusions about the
exchange of information and ideas in the digital realm, especially
where the forum is controlled by few and depended on by many.
Monopoly power over control of a market occurs when
an entity possesses the ability to control a resource’s pricing
across competition levels without a grossly adverse effect on the
controller.74 Legally speaking, the determination of monopoly
status depends on the presence of direct or indirect evidence of
an entity’s control over the market.75 Direct evidence
encompasses a showing of a firm’s ability to reduce total market
output and still raise the price of goods beyond the competitive

70

Amir Bagherpour & Ali Nouri, COVID Misinformation is Killing People, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/covid-misinformationis-killing-people1/.
71
Elisa Shearer, Social media outpaces print newspapers in the U.S. as a news source, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-newssource/.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
75
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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level.76 However, when such direct proof is unavailable—it rarely
is—courts will usually examine the market structure within the
industry to search for circumstantial evidence.77 Circumstantial
evidence of monopoly formation consists of inferences
concerning a firm’s possession of a dominant market share and
whether entry barriers prevent new competition from responding
to fluctuations in resource cost.78 Indirect evidence is
overwhelmingly present within the discussion of several
platforms and their monopolistic control of access to discourse,
supported by inelastic demand,79 as the ubiquity of Facebook,
Twitter, and few others within public discourse is as undeniable
as their control of the market.80 In its simplest iteration, the
emerging informational monopoly seeks to subjugate perhaps
the most vital resource in First Amendment jurisprudence:
access to the public forum.
The Supreme Court addressed social media as the
“modern public square” in a case concerning the
constitutionality of a North Carolina statute criminalizing the
act of a registered sex offender gaining access to particular
websites, including Facebook and Twitter.81 The Court’s use of
this construction opens discussion of platforms as public spaces,
girded with the appropriate First Amendment principles.82 Chief
among them in Packingham’s case is the basic rule of a right to
speak in a public forum,83 now contextualized within social
media and the Internet. The Court considers cyberspace—social
media in particular—as easing the task of locating a particular

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Facebook claims to reach 210 million consumers in the U.S. alone. See Leading
Countries Based on Facebook Audience Size As Of October 2020, STATISTA (Oct. 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-offacebook-users/ (stating that Facebook reaches 190 million consumers in the U.S.);
see also @TwitterIR, Q2 2020 Letter to Shareholders, TWITTER at 12 (Jul. 23, 2020),
https://s22.q4cdn.com/826641620/files/doc_financials/2020/q2/Q2-2020Shareholder-Letter.pdf (stating that Twitter averaged 36 million users for Q2 of
2020).
80
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (noting that “seven in
ten American adults use at least one Internet social networking service”).
81
Id. at 1738.
82
Id. at 1735.
83
Id.
77
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locale for exchanging ideas, calling cyberspace the “vast
democratic forums of the Internet.”84
While there are issues with the Court’s public space dicta,
such as the confusion it invites when applying a public forum
analysis to a private digital arena, the Court has pressed the
public forum beyond a sole physical location before. In
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of University of Virginia,85 the Court
found the allocation of school funds to student activities qualified
as the creation of a public forum where “[o]nce it has opened a
limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set.”86 The Court went on to recognize
that the fund is a “forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial
or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”87
However, a formidable legal distinction between the Court’s
consideration of “metaphysical”88 fora in Rosenberger and
Internet space in Packingham suggests the unthinkable. Namely,
an attempt at extending the public forum doctrine to platforms
would press public forum rules into an exclusively private space,
owned and operated by nongovernmental actors.
Nevertheless, the Court’s dicta in Packingham has invited
further discussion into the concept of platforms as public fora
within the context of the First Amendment. The Packingham
Court recognized that sites like Twitter operated as a channel by
which citizens could “petition their elected representatives and
otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”89 Ultimately,
Packingham introduced the question of public space on the
Internet as a public forum but did not resolve the question itself.
Courts have already begun to hear arguments
incorporating the Packingham dicta, like in Knight First
Amendment Institute v. Trump,90 where claimants argued that the
presentation and operation of the President’s Twitter account
echoed Packingham’s “modern public square” and applied it as

84

Id. at 1735 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
86
Id. at 829.
87
Id. at 830.
88
Id.
89
Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1735.
90
928 F.3d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 2019).
85
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such to the public forum doctrine.91 The Second Circuit affirmed
district court’s finding, concluding that President Trump had
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by
blocking certain users’ access to his account.92 Holding the First
Amendment does not permit a public official’s utilization of a
social media account in an official capacity to exclude persons,
due to the open dialogue the platform invites, the Court found
President Trump had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by
depriving these users of access to his social media account simply
because he disagreed with their speech.93 In summary, the
President constructed what amounted to a digital town hall
where he accommodated public discussion.94 He also presented
the speech within the forum in a way that was closely identified
by the public as governmental.95 It becomes readily evident the
use of social media in this way was sufficiently controlled by the
government to render this type of exchange subject to a forum
analysis under normal circumstances.96
When the government’s use of a private platform
manifests a designated public forum in a way that it should
require constitutional protections, it also carries consideration
for the degree of scrutiny that restricting access to such forum
places upon individual rights. The fact that a Twitter account can
be construed as a communicative apparatus of the President of
the United States should suffice to answer whether a privately
controlled platform can overstep its role in facilitating
communication. When construed in such a manner, the platform
becomes undeniably linked to government ownership or control
to some degree.
During COVID-19, platforms are becoming even more
imperative to discourse, as their usage has risen between fifteen
91

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)
(holding that “[o]pening an instrumentality of communication for indiscriminate use
by the general public creates a public forum”); see also Knight First Amend. Inst., 928
F.3d at 237.
92
Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 230.
93
Id.
94
See Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009); see also Knight First
Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 239–40.
95
See Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 239–40 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at
478).
96
See id. (citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1733, 1760 (2017)).
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and twenty-seven percent during the first months of the
pandemic.97 Given this rapid rise in the face of lockdown orders
and the cancellation of in-person events, COVID-19 represents
the necessary concrete data to quell the naysayers who might
argue social media still needs the liability protections afforded by
Section 230. While COVID-19 might be an isolated and
historically magnitudinous event, the increase in platform usage
conclusively demonstrates when other avenues are closed,
privately controlled social media platforms are the premier
option for engaging in public discourse.
The lack of government control of platforms despite their
use for official government speech, coupled with societal reliance
on platform services, begins to manifest the shape of an
informational monopoly exerting its influence on the public
forum. The indirect evidence of an informational monopoly is
clearly implicated in its evolution from supplementary channel
to a nearly realized First Amendment public forum. At this
moment in time, a large majority of Americans use social media
across a small number of platforms to inject their speech into the
marketplace. Those platforms are being utilized, even at the
highest levels of government, as a means of imparting
government speech to the citizenry and allowing for reciprocal
interactivity, so much so that the President cannot
constitutionally deny members access to his account on a private
platform. Platforms are in a position where they hold the power
to host both accurate and inaccurate data in the same channels
and oversee the transactional exchange of information. In this
role, platforms have reached a position of such utility that they
can be considered public fora, with little hope of government
regulation of these interactions.98 Platforms stepping into this
role effectively creates a microcosm of the Marketplace of Ideas
where only the rules of the platform apply and are solely under
their control, growing ever-immunized from affectation by
market forces or other intervention.

97

Ella Koeze, The Virus Change the Way We Internet, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 7, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirusinternet-use.html.
98
See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values
and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1123, 1131 (2011) (noting that
the ultimate determination of illegality of any social media post must await judicial
determination, since speech cannot be censored by a government official pursuant to
the prior restraint doctrine).
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This lack of interactivity is especially problematic when it
insulates users from the truth-rearing effects of the Marketplace
or when the forum itself does not consider allowing Marketplace
function essential to its operation. The most valuable effect of the
Marketplace is its power to affirm or deny a particular viewpoint,
which in turn, will appropriately signal information to peripheral
participants as valuable. What has been occurring, however, is
users are endowed with the power to cultivate what market
forces they are subject to when espousing a particular idea,
backed by platforms’ encouragement of information isolation.99
Unfortunately, most consider the issue as something that can be
passively addressed by letting the Marketplace work its
“magic.”100 As an ongoing assertion of this piece, it should be
noted the Marketplace only operates effectively when its
members are engaging properly with a diversity of opinion.101
An appropriate illustration for foreshowing this issue
exists in the deregulation of balanced information in traditional
media. In 1949, the Federal Communications Commission
enacted the Fairness Doctrine, which expanded requirements for
news broadcasters holding them responsible for diversifying
news offerings.102 The Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. F.C.C.,103 held unanimously the Fairness Doctrine was
constitutional, and diversity of opinion was essential to
informing the electorate about controversial issues in a balanced
manner.104 The Court saw the necessity in the balancing of
opinion and the encouragement of discourse as a means of
dispelling the chilling effect caused by broadcasting

99

See Emily Bazelon, The First Amendment in the Age of Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/magazine/freespeech.html.
100
See Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a “Marketplace of Ideas” and the Right to Truth,
3 AM. AFFAIRS 198, 203–05 (2019); see also R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the
Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 384–89 (1974).
101
See Clinton, supra note 53.
102
In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (F.C.C.
1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 26.372, 26.374 (1974).
103
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
104
Id. at 390–93.
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organizations presenting listeners with only a single perspective,
cultivating a skewed opinion in the electorate.105
Yet, the current state of traditional media’s content
cultivation stands in stark contrast to the objectives of the
Fairness Doctrine, and the result is an ever-weakened
Marketplace. Content produced and carried by news outlets no
longer requires context on opposition, leaving traditional news
media the power to isolate and immunize its audience from
having to engage with contrary opinions.106 Platforms seem
poised to follow the same path of allowing users to bypass the
Marketplace in favor of a cacophony of imbalanced information
where one may stitch together an amalgam of a political opinion.
C. Trolling Takes Lives: The National Security Interest in Platform
Regulation
This Subsection looks to how the structure of the
platform’s arena robs the Marketplace of its responsibility to
inflict negative consequences on certain types of speech. The
circumvention of Marketplace functionality is accomplished
through the preservation of speaker anonymity and the lack of
expense normally levied upon dangerous speech. In preventing
the infliction of cost by preserving anonymity and facilitating
connectivity among otherwise isolated persons, platforms enable
bad-faith users to ensure their speech lands only on the ears of
supporters. In contrast, where the ideas are submitted to a more
public space, they are susceptible to counter-speech, peripheral
consequence, or losing social capital on account of their
unsavory opinion where they might not be heeded in the future.
Americans recognize that misinformation is an issue but
continue to indulge their cognitive preferences rather than
process information with public interest in mind.107 And they will
continue to do so without some sort of cost to the absent-minded
105

Id. at 387 (noting the right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound
truck, or any other individual does not include a right to snuff out the free speech of
others).
106
Kevin M. Kruse, How Policy Decisions Spawned Today’s Hyperpolarized Media,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/17/how-policy-decisionsspawned-todays-hyperpolarized-media/.
107
Kirsten Weir, Why We Fall for Fake News: Hijacked Thinking Or Laziness, AM.
PSYCH. ASS’N (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.apa.org/news/apa/2020/02/fakenews.
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dissemination of false information.108 Despite several gruesome
and sobering events, there is a noticeable, widespread absence of
fear associated with the consequences of misinformation.
For example, in June of 2016, Omar Mateen shot and
killed forty-nine people in Pulse nightclub in Florida109 after
being radicalized on the Internet.110 This attack prompted
families of three of the victims to sue Facebook, Twitter, and
Google, alleging that the platforms provided material support to
the ISIS terror organization and sought civil remedy under the
relevant provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA).111 The
families argued that the companies had hosted terrorist rhetoric
and profited from the promulgation of terrorist propaganda by
virtue of hosting this type of speech on their websites.112 The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, in Fields v.
Twitter113 dismissed these claims under the liability protections of
Section 230 and held publisher liability was shielded by the
Act.114 Due to Section 230 liability, there is scant legal incentive
for platforms to police this kind of speech, though the issue might
also be attributed to the very nature of the indirect
communication taking place on platforms. The interconnectivity
of the Internet and platform accommodations allows groups that
were impossibly dispersed due to their geography the
opportunity to communicate, recruit new members, and
coordinate efforts to engage in terror.115 Further complicating
matters is the First Amendment preservation of association and
advocacy, though First Amendment rights do not extend to
108

Amy Mitchell, Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem that Needs to
Be Fixed, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 5, 2019),
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109
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2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/orlando-shooting-america.html.
110
Ed Pilkington, FBI and Obama Confirm Omar Mateen Was Radicalized on the Internet,
GUARDIAN
(June
14,
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conduct that might serve to advance terror activities where
violence is involved116 such as the direct “incitement of imminent
lawless action.”117 Unfortunately, addressing these issues in a
social media context requires that the Marketplace of Ideas move
beyond the borders of the First Amendment.
The cross-border capabilities of platforms enable the
efforts of bad actors and misinformers to inflict even
international consequences on persons in a different continent,
country or jurisdiction.118 Platforms provide easy access to the
tools of information dissemination and an audience to consume
it, especially where it can be done with little expense to the
speaker both with respect to resources and anonymity.119 Up
until this point, operational control of major platforms has been
a solely American exercise.120 However, given the inevitable
growth of interconnectivity via social media, there is a major
issue on the horizon that First Amendment jurisprudence has yet
to face: What happens when American courts are no longer able
to affect the behavior of a foreign-controlled platform?
In response to the widespread use of two social media
entities gaining traction in the U.S., President Trump sought to
exercise his powers under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to declare a national emergency
to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has
its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States.”121 On May 15, 2019, President Trump issued Executive
Order 13873, under the IEEPA and the National Emergencies
116

Ashutosh Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 617–18 (2014).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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See Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 521–31 (2009); Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us
No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/
2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/6HZ7-TGYX].
119
See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 197, 201–02 (2006) (“[T]he art of
terrorist communication has evolved to a point which the terrorists themselves can
now control the entire production process.”).
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(Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networksranked-by-number-of-users/ (As of 2020, four of the five most popular social
networks by users are owned by American companies: Facebook, YouTube,
WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger).
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Act,122 with respect to the threat posed by foreign interests related
to the United States’ information and communication
technology and services, finding that such entities were
“increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities . . . which
store and communicate vast amounts of sensitive information . .
.”123 Under Executive Orders 13942124 (the “TikTok Executive
Order”) and 13943125 (the “WeChat Executive Order”),
President Trump sought to address two named entities amidst
concerns of the Chinese government’s influence over ByteDance
and Tencent, who oversaw the operation of the former and the
latter respectively.126 The Trump Administration pointed to the
Chinese government’s requirements that private Chinese
companies assist in its intelligence and surveillance efforts127 as
rationale for banning the platforms from domestic operation. In
U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump,128 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California recognized that the
government illuminated a threat that Tencent posed to national
security, but ultimately found the government action was not
narrowly tailored enough to address the government’s national
security interest.129 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Marland v. Trump,130 found
that the government’s descriptions of a potential national
security threat posed by TikTok were hypothetical based on
ByteDance’s “significant and close ties to the CCP which could
potentially be leveraged to further [the CCP’s] agenda.”131
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50 U.S.C. § 1601.
See Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019).
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125
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488 F.Supp.3d 912, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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Id. at *2.
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Despite the Trump administration’s efforts to ban the use
of TikTok and WeChat falling short, the very existence of the
suits acknowledges that national security interests could be
associated with a platform’s possession of personal information.
A platform’s potential role as an informant further reinforces the
need for concern when discussing the power that social media
platforms possess in society, both domestically and globally.
Continually integrating and affecting discourse within the
Marketplace, it is an inescapable fact that platforms hold
infinitely more power than they did at the inception of Section
230. Whether that power lies in their control of data presentation
in the marketplace, installing themselves as preferred arenas of
discourse—rising even to that of a public forum—in their
operation, or as a means of allowing bad faith actors and interests
to circumvent the tests of the Marketplace and other fail-safes
afforded by the justice system, it is time to place renewed
pressure on the role of platforms.
III. SOLVING THE SECTION 230 PUZZLE (OR NOT)
Before engaging with possible alterations or revocations
to Section 230, it is prudent to summarize what exactly the
solutions are required to address. Subsection (a) of Part II
demonstrated that platforms profit on users ignoring the
assumptions of the Marketplace of Ideas; users are not adept
enough self-regulators to discern proper sources of information
when obfuscated by platforms, and the sharing of false
information has significant and fatal consequences in a time of
crisis. Subsection (b) examined the construction of an
informational monopoly where a few platforms have become
installed as fundamental institutions of American discourse,
rising to the level of being considered quasi-public fora under the
public forum analysis, despite their status as private entities, and
all but ensuring their place as gatekeepers of information.
Finally, Subsection (c) demonstrated the considerable national
security interest both future and realized when bad faith actors
can use social media without consequence and the considerable
power platforms have in controlling the information associated
with these exchanges. This Section will begin with an
examination of the lattice of issues that repealing Section 230
would implicate and then address several of the contemporary
adjustments and developments concerning Section 230 doctrine.
These developments include adjustments of jurisprudential
interpretation in Section 230 liability cases, the proposed
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statutory changes to the Section 230 by the former Trump
Department of Justice, comments made by Twitter CEO Jack
Dorsey during a Congressional hearing in October 2020 and the
current state of tech’s feelings toward Section 230 reform, and
Justice Thomas’ thoughts on the foreboding Section 230 issue
that still has yet to be considered by the Supreme Court.
A. Obstacles in the Path Ahead
The main concern with the elimination or restriction of
Section 230 protections is one of scope, manifested in both the
scope of monetary expenditures for operations and the scale of
moderating such a large volume of inputs. When thinking of
whether a company like Facebook should be punished for
wrongdoing, Americans are quick to vilify social media
platforms for issues only tangentially related to Section 230
liability. Some take issue with the polices of private entities as
“censoring” free speech, while others take issue with the lack of
censorship for content they observe to be false or offensive, but
the negative perception of social media is not kept according to
ideology.132 During a survey conducted in July of 2020, Pew
Research observed that sixty-four percent of Americans find
social media to have a mostly negative effect on the country.133
The logical conclusion is that given the immense power a
company like Facebook has to affect public opinion, they should
also suffer the consequences of wrongdoing or, at the very least,
be forced to litigate a bit more often. However, an expansion of
liability would likely result in increased costs to platforms in the
form of legal fees, payout on damages, and other operational
expenses that might still fail to solve the problem of affording
greater protections to user.134 While especially fatal to smaller
132

Emily A. Vogels, Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor Political Viewpoints,
PEW RSCH.CTR., (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-socialmedia-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/.
133
Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative Effect on
the Way Things Are Going In the U.S. Today, PEW RSCH. CTR., (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americans-say-socialmedia-have-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-the-u-s-today/.
134
Roger McNamee, Social Media Platforms Claim Moderation Will Reduce Harassment,
Disinfromation and Conspiracies. It Won’t, TIME, (June 24, 2020),
https://time.com/5855733/social-media-platforms-claim-moderation-will-reduceharassment-disinformation-and-conspiracies-it-wont/.
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Internet startups without the capital to engage in high-cost
lawsuits, large platforms might respond with a change in their
revenue structures, moving from an ad-based model towards a
subscription model to make-up for the increased operating costs.
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey put the point rather bluntly,
noting that “[e]roding the foundation of Section 230 could
collapse how we communicate on the Internet, leaving only a
small number of giant and well-funded technology
companies.”135 Assuming that only the mighty are left
standing—and they likely would be—it would further
concentrate power in the hands of a few sites that would begin to
tighten their policies on community standards and censorship on
their platforms to comply with new rules. In such a scenario,
those remaining would be forced to decide between facilitating
similar open forums like those we have been accustomed to or
dropping their existing models to adopt a more risk-averse course
of business.
Additionally, the scope issue does not end with a
potential increase in monetary costs to users. It also implicates
the benefits sought by users in contributing to social media in the
first place. In the instance where platforms are compelled to
reduce risk of litigation, they will certainly resort to increased
censorship of contributions, effectively creating the chilling effect
that the Marketplace seeks to prevent.136 Platforms would be
presented with the issue of how to develop standards for
community content and the processes for how those standards
develop over time, save for concerns that such standards might
be imposed discriminately. This assumes that the platform in
question could even approach such a task. Given the number of
inputs in just twenty-four hours on a platform like Facebook, the
amount of moderation needed to ensure that no offensive or
harmful content would reach its target seems implausible, even
given the vast wealth of resources at their disposal.137 In these
135

Aaron Holmes, Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube’s Business Models Could Get Crushed If
a Law Called Section 230 Gets Repealed, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-section-230-repeal-crush-social-mediafacebook-twitter-google-2020-10 (internal quotations omitted).
136
See Christopher Gao, Social Media Censorship, Free Speech, and the Super Apps,
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/socialmedia-censorship-free-speech.
137
H. Tankovska, Facebook: Number of Active Daily Users Worldwide 2011-2020, (Feb. 2,
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/346167/facebook-globaldau/#:~:text=During%20the%20third%20quarter%20of,percent%20of%20monthly
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instances, it seems all-too-likely that a platform would rather just
remove a particular voice from their space, rather than try to
head off its problem statements, a presumed outcome that would
fall in stark contrast to both the legislative intent of Section 230
and the operation of the Marketplace of Ideas.
B. Courts’ Role in Protecting the Marketplace
There are two jurisprudential shifts the courts could take
if they determined that it was necessary to circumvent the
legislature and render a new construction of Section 230 liability.
First, the courts could affect Section 230 liability through the
expansion of the Brandenburg doctrine as it relates to speakers.138
Noted by Michael Sherman in his article, Brandenburg v.
Twitter,139 the Court has never actually defined the term
“imminence” as a precise temporal measure but finds it sufficient
to merely say whether the requirement threshold has been met.140
Sherman takes note of the capacity by which one could
communicate during the time period when Brandenburg had
been decided, asserting the nature of imminence was much easier
to understand as a concept in light of a person’s ability to reach
a mass audience.141 This same contention is noted by John
Cronan, who argued that the imminence requirement “does not
work with the vast majority of Internet communications, as
words in cyberspace are usually ‘heard’ well after they are
‘spoken.’”142 This solution seems practical on its face, especially
given the harm that even the most innocuous comment can
cause, but the question of imminence carries with it another
consideration: At the time of incitement, did the speaker actually
intend their speech to have a specifically desired effect on a
%20active%20users.&text=With%20over%202.7%20billion%20monthly,most%20po
pular%20social%20network%20worldwide (finding that Facebook reported almost
1.82 billion daily users during the third quarter of 2020).
138
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that speech likely to
incite imminent lawless action was not protected by the First Amendment).
139
See Michael J. Sherman, Brandenburg v. Twitter, 28.2 GEO. MASON. U. C.R.L.J.
127, 128–36 (2019).
140
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (finding that Hess’s speech asserting
that “[w]e’ll take the fucking street again” was not sufficient to determine that Hess
intended to incite lawless action or was likely to do so).
141
Sherman, supra note 139, at 167.
142
John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an
Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 428 (2002).
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targeted audience? Sherman takes note of the chilling concern
that this type of jurisprudential shift would create and recalls
Justice Steven’s language from Claiborne Hardware in its
restriction of the freedom to make “spontaneous and emotional
appeals” that are tied to this liability for any future reaction.143
To Sherman, the elevation of a chilling concern raises a new
concept of a heckler’s veto where their speech is enshrined for
perpetuity based on any given reaction to their speech.144 Doing
so would also require that prosecutors demonstrate these
outbursts were intended to be recurring in their same form across
myriad audiences with the same effect.
The inevitable question of this approach is clear at the
outset, however, and, considering past efforts by the government
to censor freedom of speech,145 it is ultimately unpalatable as it
significantly burdens any future speech on platforms. The
possibility of a government using a crisis as a means of
justification to restrict certain types of speech could easily
balloon beyond its practical application and result in a catch-all
justification for chilling speech in myriad circumstances deemed
necessary by the government.146 Consider this approach in the
context of a post containing COVID-19 misinformation on social
media, such as a post advocating against wearing a mask despite
contrary guidelines from formal sources. In the instance where
one could prove the intention of a post to be inciting lawlessness,
it would certainly halt any sharing whatsoever, of even goodfaith actors, for fear of being punished even if it was a just an
impulsive posting. The force of Section 230 liability cannot be an
authoritative test of truth, but rather should return discourse to
Marketplace forces. If the courts suddenly construct some sort of
litmus test for truth that acts as gatekeeping for speech, they have
effectively created a means of chilling speech on a massive scale.
The consequence of applying a test for truthfulness also raises
questions about how the standard for truth or intent would be
conducted. If left to judges, it might also result in any number of
standards being applied that could lead to inconsistent results
across jurisdictions. Additionally, this approach also does little
143

See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
Sherman, supra note 139, at 171.
145
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371–73 (1927) (holding that, under the
Criminal Syndicalism Act, the state can exercise its police power to punish
utterances of words with bad tendency).
146
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that the
military necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage warranted the
evacuation and internment order that restricted the rights of Asian-Americans).
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to affect platform control of discourse and the effects that it might
have on the closing of other public fora. While imposing liability
on platforms may be a part of an eventual solution, changing the
way intention is interpreted on social media does not appear the
wisest course, as it may quickly devolve into a jurisprudential
mire of imprecise definitions and would likely chill more speech
than it frees.
That’s not to say that courts agree they are an improper
arena for taking Section 230 to task. In a filing where the
Supreme Court declined to review a case alleging an issue within
the scope of Section 230, Justice Thomas released a statement
arguing that lower courts need to be corrected in their
interpretation of the protections conferred upon online
platforms.147 Justice Thomas notes that, since its inception, the
liability doctrine of Section 230 has gone twenty-four years
without interpretation of the civil immunity provision contained
within.148 Fixating on the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on “policy and
purpose” of Section 230 as grounds to conclude immunity is
unavailable to plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conduct,
Thomas asserts that the emphasis on nontextual grounds by
lower courts has resulted in questionable precedent that should
be considered by the Supreme Court.149 In typical fashion,
Thomas argues that the legislative intention of Section 230 is
clear on its face and serves to (1) allow the hosting and
transmission of third-party content without being subject to
liability and (2) direct immunity from some civil liability
stemming from good-faith acts to restrict access or outright
remove offensive content.150 In considering the interpretation of
the lower courts, Thomas observes that there are a number of
issues with the expansion of Section 230 liability.
First, he identifies the holding in Zeran as particularly
troublesome, as the lack of distinction between publisher and
distributor liability has resulted in the conferring of immunity
147

Enigma Software Grp. v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement on denial of certiorari); see also
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222–26 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari).
148
Malwarebyets, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 13.
149
Id. at 15.
150
Id.
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“even when a company distributes content that it knows is
illegal.”151 Thomas acknowledges that there is some overlap in
this distinction, but ultimately this interpretation should be
questioned based on the clear congressional intent contained
within other areas of the CDA and a lack of congressional intent
to carve out such an exception.152
Second, Thomas takes issue with the interpretation in
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley,153 where the Ninth
Circuit held that, in effect, Section 230 protection affords
immunity to a platform’s own content.154 Thomas asserts that a
natural reading of the statute only grants publisher protections
where content is “provided by another information content
provider.”155 Coupled with the provisions that allow for a
publisher to host, withdraw, or alter content for presentation,
Thomas’ construction of the lower courts’ interpretation suggests
that even in the event of adding commentary or editing content
the platforms may function without liability.156
Finally, Thomas contends that the immunity offered to
platforms when they allow objectional content to persist only
applies where the platforms unknowingly decline to perform
editorial functions, where the current interpretation allows for
companies to racially discriminate, host terror groups, and
complicate tracking criminal activity.157 While the manner in
which one interprets the provisions of Section 230 liability might
differ, Thomas’ concern about a lack of Supreme Court guidance
151

Id.
Id. at 15 (noting that Congress uses the same categorial language as in § 230(c)(1)
regarding the removal of content but refrained from doing so). But see § 230(c)(2).
153
521 F. 3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
154
See id. at 1165.
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Malwarebyets, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 14; see Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley,
at 1165 (emphasis added).
156
Malwarebyets, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 16; see § 230(f)(3) (suggesting that providers are
liable for content in which they contribute to development); see also Jones v. Dirty
World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F. 3d 398, 403, 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2014)
(interpreting “development” narrowly to “preserv[e] the broad immunity th[at §230]
provides for website operators’ exercise of traditional publisher functions”).
157
Malwarebyets, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 17; Sikhs for Justice, v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F.
App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017), aff ’g 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(concluding that “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune” under
§230(c)(1)); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16–21 (1st Cir.
2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F. 3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2019) (granting immunity
and reasoning that recommending content “is an essential result of publishing” even
in the instance where a platform recommended content circulated by terrorists).
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in lower court jurisprudence seems valid in context, given the
absence of standards for review in the courts and the effects that
such liberal constructions of Section 230 have wrought.
Tightening the interpretation of the courts might not be the best
origination for correcting the consequences of Section 230, but it
is certainly not lost on the Supreme Court that action on Section
230 liability might be warranted in the future. For the policy
reasons stated above, Justice Thomas’ assertion that allowing the
legal process to simply run its course by giving plaintiffs a chance
to bring about claims in the first place would somehow accord
balance to the Section 230 issue is practically incorrect. This is
hardly the first instance of Justice Thomas taking aim at
protections for speech and emblematic of Thomas’
jurisprudential vision to rectify what he perceives as judicial
activism.158 However, Thomas’ statement does suggest there is
some significant consideration and appreciation for the
legislature to return to the table on Section 230.
C. A Statutory Facelift for Section 230
In September 2020, the Department of Justice proposed
amending CDA Section 230 in the form of two changes:
expanding the definition of what constitutes an information
content provider and excluding decisions to “restrict access to or
availability of material” from publisher immunity.159 The DOJ
summarized the need for reform in its cover letter to Congress,
stating “[t]he proposed legislation accordingly seeks to align the
scope of Section 230 immunities with the realities of the modern
[I]nternet while ensuring that the [I]nternet remains a place for

158

See Zachary Tooman, Fear and Loathing in the Court: Justice Thomas’ Audience of One
in McKee v. Cosby, FIRST AMEND. L. REV.,
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Compare Ramseyer Draft Legislative Reforms to Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, U.S. DOJ (Sept. 23, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/file/1319331/download with 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (illustrating the
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free and vibrant discussion.”160 The expansion of the definition
would potentially cover actions of editorialization by platforms
during online content-hosting. This directly affects the scope of
immunity under Section 230(c)(1) that provides platforms are
not held liable due to their hosting, rather than publication, of
third-party speech161 The clarification proposed by the DOJ aims
to prevent the use of Section 230 as a shield for platforms to
escape liability.162
The second proposal grants immunity to platforms where
they acted in “good faith” in restricting access or availability of
material based on an objective standard that the content is
deserving of removal or restriction.163 Additionally, removal or
restriction would be required to have an accompanying rationale
for the editorialization and an opportunity for the aggrieved to
respond to the platform’s decision.164 In doing so, the DOJ
intends platforms to be held liable for harms arising from specific
material where the platforms are active in their modification or
permission of such content. Like the first proposal, there is also
a question of the effects it would have on the judicial system,
albeit from the opposite side of the bench. Given the amount of
content hosted on platforms each day, monitoring and attending
to that volume of material would be astronomical, even for the
largest providers, let alone the enormous burden it might place
on smaller entities. However, in the space where the government
and platforms might compromise, there could be a workable
solution that imparts less substantial cost on the parties involved
given the immense power concentrated among several of the
more influential platforms.

160

Office of the Attorney General Letter to the Honorable Michael R. Pence, U.S. DOJ, at 2
(Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1319346/download.
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requirements when restricting access or availability of material).
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D. What Do the Platforms Say?
In a congressional hearing to the Senate Commerce
Committee on October 28, 2020, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey
posited three suggestions concerning the expansion of Section
230: (1) requiring companies to publish information about how
they moderate decisions, (2) making them offer a
“straightforward” process for users to appeal those decisions,
and (3) letting users select which algorithms dictate what content
they view on online platforms.165 Unfortunately, Dorsey did not
expand upon how exactly his suggestions would be
implemented, who would determine the standards for sufficient
implementation and moderation, or who would hold platforms
accountable for following through on their promises.
In the wake of the violence at the Capitol on January 6,
2021, tech companies have conceded the need to regulate their
platforms.166 As of March 2021, Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg has promised that he will come to Congress with a
proposal that would revise the current federal internet
regulations related to unlawful content.167 In testimony to
Congress before the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
Zuckerberg offered that platforms “should only be shielded from
[] liablility in instances where they are have systems in place for
identifying unlawful content and removing it.”168 However, he
added, platforms cannot be held liable for something that they
fail to detect.169 In a separate House Energy and Commerce
Committee meeting, Google CEO Sundar Pichai stated he was
“concerned” with the recent enthusiasm to reform or repeal
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Section 230.170 He noted the harm of both free expression and the
ability of the platforms to act on their own accord to protect
users.171 Jack Dorsey did not directly mention Section 230 or
specific reforms related to its provisions in his remarks to the
Committee.172
In all honesty, without movement or cooperation from
the platforms themselves, the situation quickly spirals into a sort
of Nash equilibrium,173 where neither party sees itself gaining
some sort of unilateral advantage in the exchange. Platforms see
the weakening of Section 230 liability or a change in perspective
upon review to be a challenge to their bottom line and, as
discussed above, they have no issue profiting off the effects of
misinformation.174 Alternatively, if former President Trump’s
frequent use of Twitter is to become the norm for leaders in the
U.S. as a means of communicating with constituents, the
increase in the impression of governmental action associated
with that type of speech implicates public forum concerns.175
Note that this interaction, while problematic in instances where
politicians blocking dissident voices, is truly remarkable.
Enhancing discourse through new technologies in the political
sphere has seen its fair share of historical counterparts, such as
Roosevelt’s fireside chats by radio or the impact of the television
on the dissemination of presidential debates.176
170
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However, in opening the hearing with remarks about the
reformation of Section 230 doctrine, one can make a simple
assumption of platforms’ understanding of their position in
American discourse and First Amendment jurisprudence.
Namely, Americans recognize that platforms are very difficult to
live without in this moment. Mr. Dorsey’s statement is an
admission that he recognizes the American people and the
United States government do not think highly of the platforms’
current position to affect so much of life without some measure
of assurance that abuses of such power in controlling
information, controlling access to an almost imperative forum,
enabling bad actors, and fighting against efforts to restrain them.
Looking to the future, if American society is to live with the
effects of social media, it must ask whether the price it pays to
platforms is worth the damage caused to the institution of the
Marketplace of Ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION
The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated
the already-present issues with allowing an antiquated liability
doctrine to protect entities elevated beyond its legislative intent.
There is an inherent tension between the interest in an individual
minimizing the harms that social media might proliferate while
still enjoying the benefits becoming evermore commonplace in
American communication. Users rightly value their ability to
take part in the process of discourse, where the interchange of
ideas serves its most important function as a means of education
through conflicting inputs. And in theory, social media should
propel that interaction to its zenith.
However, COVID-19 has proven that users are not in a
place to self-regulate, nor are platforms rushing to create
scenarios where they might be subjected to liability or social
consequences for their role. Conversely, the public largely fails
in its role to recognize the issues with misinformation being
shared absent proper scrutiny and correctly worries about its ill
effects. Namely, it requires effort on the individual’s part. In this
period of uncertainty, the value of accurate information is
imperative to the strength of democracy. Unfortunately,
Americans have been convincingly reminded that the
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Marketplace of Ideas requires maintenance from time to time
through hardship and loss.
COVID-19 should serve as the most salient reminder that
it is even more imperative to ensure that the cogs of the
Marketplace’s machinery for producing truth remain operational
and strong to service democracy in such unprecedented peril. In
effect, COVID-19 has provided the Marketplace a well-needed
opportunity for introspection. Americans, seeking to engage in
the public forum, are becoming increasingly reliant on private
entities to provide them with outlets to engage in a more
expedient manner. Even before the pandemic, there was already
a growing sentiment within the American zeitgeist signaling
social media’s rise to a station of near necessity in everyday life.
Being forced to work, communicate, and socialize during
COVID-19 has hopefully catalyzed a new perspective on social
media’s role in our public discourse and, with that role, the
weighty responsibilities associated with curating such a valuable
resource. As it stands, Section 230 is inhibiting the development
of these responsibilities, such that it may prove suffocating in the
future. At the very least, there must be some credence to Justice
Thomas’ concern that Section 230 has gone twenty-four years
without the attention of the Supreme Court to its liability
principle. While the solution is uncertain, COVID-19 has
brilliantly illuminated the ever-increasing role social media plays
as an emergent quasi-forum and the consequences such an
impossible position poses for the law.

